Syriza’s defeat deals a blow to the European Left

“Orderly debt restructuring has been done hundreds of times, hundreds, like with Germany in 1953”.

 Pablo Iglesias

As the leader of Podemos has rightly pointed out on many occasions, sovereign debt restructuring is nothing new. Why, we may ask, should post-war Germany be helped to meet its financial commitments and rebuild its shattered economies, but Greece and other southern European states should not? Well, the standard narrative on the right is that after an initial helping hand, German productivity and fiscal acumen allowed it to become a regional manufacturing powerhouse. After West Germany had sufficiently re-established itself as a responsible and affluent member of the international community, it was then helped to reunite with its crumbling, post-communist sibling. The beauty of this simplistic version of events is that it is essentially a story of redemption and triumph over adversity, and so lends moral weight to Germany’s central role in contemporary European affairs. It does not, however, hold up to scrutiny of the facts. It was Germany’s central position in the cold war, as well as its divisive position in post-war Europe that made the USA aggressively promote it as a new capitalist powerhouse on the continent. By promoting the European Coal and Steel Community (the precursor to the modern EU) with German participation, the USA embarked on a project to strengthen the Deutschmark as an additional pillar of capitalist strength, and work towards the creation of a vast trading block. Nowhere is the commitment to rebuilding the German economy clearer than in the details of the 1953 debt restructuring, where debt repayment was tied to export revenue. Creditor nations therefore had a vested interest in buying German exports, thus allowing the indebted nation to repay its debts and become ultra-competitive on the global scene.

But in the 62 years that have passed since, the rules of the game have changed beyond recognition. The European project has boomed into a vast bureaucracy overseeing a continental marketplace. With the advent of the single currency at the beginning of the century, the Eurozone members committed themselves to the observance of strict financial rules in exchange for the so-called stability of a single unit of currency designed to reduce transaction costs and promote financial security within the bloc. It is now widely known that countries, including Greece, failed miserably to meet the requirements of euro entry but were admitted anyway through a combination of financial fraud and European bonhomie. Although this may look like a tragic mistake in hindsight, it was crucial to the project that the southern European countries join the single currency in an irreversible manner. As soon as Greece, Italy and Spain were locked into a currency position which did not allow for default, they had sacrificed their only effective means of making their economies more competitive in the face of German exports (which, as I previously discussed here, are made so competitive by breaking Eurozone rules). In short, they were therefore doomed to run current account deficits vis-à-vis Germany ad infinitum. But to make matters even worse, the lack of mechanism for fiscal transfer within the Eurozone (with the original rules explicitly removing this possibility) meant that there has never been any way for the German surplus to be recycled within the union in the interest of stability and balanced growth. The single currency has been deeply flawed from the start.

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Greece and the Eurogroup: The more things change, the more they stay the same

‘”We cannot negotiate with those who say ‘What’s mine is mine and what’s yours is negotiable’”.

John F. Kennedy

So after all the negotiation, tension and gamesmanship of the past few weeks Greece is essentially back to where it started. Have no doubt about it, the announcement that Syriza has agreed to a four month extension of the existing bailout programme is a defeat for the new Greek government. As predicted on this blog over the last couple of weeks, it was always likely that a short-term deal would be found which could keep Greece in the game and offer some breathing space for all sides to work out a long-term deal. This is not the bridging loan envisaged by Varoufakis in his opening Eurogroup discussion but it does at least offer the much needed finance and some element of budgetary freedom. But it does so at the expense of maintaining the crushing austerity measures which were at the heart of Syriza’s electoral campaign. It is hard to see how Syriza can dress this up as anything but a defeat and as Varoufakis’ erstwhile nemesis, Wolfgang Schäuble (maybe he should be renamed Wolgang Schadenfreude) has delighted in pointing out, this deal will be hard to sell to the Greek people.

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But if the popular press is to be believed, the Greeks have not reacted badly to this austerity extension. Perhaps political pragmatism has come to the fore with recognition that this was the best deal on offer. However, Syriza has until tomorrow to present its creditors with a list of reforms that will accompany the finance extension. The devil, as always, will be in the detail and Tspiras and Varoufakis will be hard pressed to word this in a way which maintains their commitment to shaking off the shackles of austerity.

It seems incredible that Syriza has only been in power for a few weeks. But more incredible is the extent to which they have bent to the will of the troika and the Eurogroup in the face of inflexibility from their negotiating partners. Talk of 50% debt haircuts was watered down into growth-linked bonds before finally morphing into what looks like a continuation of the current programme. This is not only a defeat for the democratic will of the Greek people, who had firmly rejected the current austerity measures, but it is a reinforcement of the financial straight-jacket which has been at the root of Greece’s humanitarian crisis. Syriza may have secured additional short-term funds but much of this will be returned to its creditors in the form of debt and interest repayment. Very little (if any) will find its way to the Greek people, who must continue to suffer so that financial principles can be upheld.

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Crunch time in Greek debt crisis: time for compromise?

It is well and truly crunch time and this week will be pivotal in defining the future of Greece and the Eurozone. It was interesting to read criticism this morning of Syriza’s approach to negotiations over the last couple of weeks, with at least one commentator pointing out that Varoufakis’ negotiating actions have not matched his academic knowledge of game theory. Let’s not forget though that at least he is showing willingness to resolve the situation in a way that will keep Greece solvent and avoid disaster. This is more than can be said for his Eurogroup partners.

Later today Syriza faces a vote of confidence in the Greek Parliament. Although it is likely to gain enough votes, this is just a precursor to tomorrow’s meeting in Brussels of EU finance ministers which could be one of the last opportunities to take steps towards a compromise before things start to unravel. After the ECB stopped accepting Greek bonds as collateral on loans last week, the National Bank of Greece has been forced to increase its operations through the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) in order to prop up the Greek banks. This is essentially a form of credit sanctioned by the ECB but with the proviso that it can be cut off at any moment if the ECB feels it is excessive. The end of Greek ELA would be the point of no return, leading to a run on Greek banks, bankruptcy and a certain exit from euro. Even now, Greek bank deposits continue to plummet at an alarming rate, adding to the likelihood of a run on the banks. Unless things change dramatically Greece will surely have to institute capital controls very soon to hang on to what’s left in their financial system. According to the ECB, Greek banks have lost around 21 billion euros since December, amounting to unsustainable losses. Although capital controls would break the European Union Treaty, this is not without precedent, and Cyprus was allowed to introduce this measure, with some success, in 2013. However, this will be an unpopular measure within Greece and is likely to be a severe test for Tsipras and his government.

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